










Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/113725                                                 
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
Systematicity in Kant’s third Critique 
Andrew Cooper – andrew.j.cooper@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Penultimate draft – please refer to published version: 
https://www.pdcnet.org/idstudies/content/idstudies_2019_0999_1_14_83  
Idealistic Studies 47(3), 2019 
 
 
Abstract: Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment is often interpreted in light of its 
initial reception. Conventionally, this reception is examined in the work of Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel, who found in Kant’s third Critique a new task for philosophy: 
the construction of an absolute, self-grounding system. This paper identifies an 
alternative line of reception in the work of physiologists and medical practitioners 
during the 1790s and early 1800s, including Kielmeyer, Reil, Girtanner and Oken. It 
argues that these naturalists called on Kant’s third Critique to solidify an experimental 
natural history that classifies organic form within system of laws. Kant held both 
kinds of system in tension, which is why the third Critique remains a singular and 
provocative text. 
 





Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment is often interpreted in light of its 
initial reception in the 1790s and early 1800s.1 In The Twenty-Five Years of 
Philosophy, Eckert Förster describes this period as one of the most productive – if not 
the most productive – in philosophical history.2 In Förster’s reconstruction, Kant’s 
third Critique outlines a passage from reason to nature by means of a negative 
representation of the understanding’s capacity to legislate nature according to the a 
priori principles of judgment. It thereby provides the scaffolding for a philosophical 
system capable of grounding itself on a principle immanent to its own operation.3 
While practically none of Kant’s successors felt that his project had succeeded, they 
nevertheless saw the construction of a complete, self-grounding system as the basic 
task of philosophy.4 Sebastian Gardner provides a similar account of the third 
Critique’s reception as follows:  
 
the CPJ exerted its greatest influence by a long chalk in the immediate 
Kantian aftermath on the German Idealists, who regarded it as the most 
important of the three Critiques – not of course in a sense that would imply its 
independence from the others, but in so far as they took it to set the agenda for 
what philosophy after Kant should do, or put another way, which for them 
came to the same thing, what should be done with Kant’s philosophy.5 
 
The interpretation of Kant’s third Critique presented by Gardner is characterized by 
what I will call absolute systematicity, the establishment of a complete philosophical 
system. While Kant argues that the discursive nature of cognition entails that freedom 
and nature are present to us from two discontinuous standpoints, the German Idealists 
identified in the third Critique – and in §§76-77 in particular – a quasi-speculative 
account of intuition for which reason and nature cohere as a system of final ends. On 
this interpretation, the entire thrust of the analytic of the beautiful and the antinomy of 
the teleological power of judgment is to exhibit our reflective capacity to represent a 
non-discursive intellect for which nature is intuited as both ordered and free.  
 The reconstruction presented by Förster and Gardner identifies a productive 
tension in Kant’s third Critique between discursive cognition and judgment’s capacity 
to operate beyond the limits of the understanding. Yet this was not the only way the 
text was received in the immediate Kantian aftermath. The goal of this paper is to 
identify an alternative line of reception in the work of physiologists and clinical 
practitioners working in medical departments across Germany in the 1790s and early 
1800s, including Karl Friedrich Kielmeyer, Johann Christian Reil, Christoph 
Girtanner and Lorenz Oken. These naturalists viewed Kant’s project in the third 
Critique as necessarily incomplete, for it casts the task of harmonization as a matter of 
empirical research. This line of interpretation is characterized by what I will call of 
experimental systematicity, for it identifies in Kant’s third Critique a programme of 
research grounded on the assumption that organic structure features within nature as a 
system of laws. While the discursive nature of cognition means that the naturalist 
cannot construct a complete natural system, reflective judgment enables the naturalist 
to conduct empirical research within a projected and yet unknown natural system. If 
we follow the experimental systematists, the achievement of the third Critique is to 
harmonize the metaphysics of nature Kant developed in the first Critique and 
Metaphysical Foundations with empirical nature, thereby opening a scientific 
framework for classification. 
The experimental systematists have received far less attention in the literature 
than the philosophers normally associated with the Kant to Hegel picture. For 
historians of philosophy, their focus on embryology, reproduction and comparative 
physiology seems too empirical to be of interest. For historians of the biological 
sciences, their work is ‘an unfortunate era dominated by arid speculation’, as Timothy 
Lenoir puts it.6 In most histories of pre-Darwinian biology, Kielmeyer, Reil, Girtanner 
and Oken are viewed within the romantic tradition of Naturphilosophie, which 
presents nature as a global organism. In contrast to this view, I argue that – with the 
exception of Oken – they explicitly opposed Naturphilosophie and sought to identify 
an alternative theoretical basis for physiology and natural history in Kant’s third 
Critique. Their appeal to Kant served to distance their work from the 
Naturphilosophen, who were seen as transgressing the experimental limits of natural 
history.7 
This paper is primarily concerned with historical understanding. Both lines of 
reception, I suggest, provide a deeper grasp of Kant’s project in the third Critique by 
highlighting the alternative standpoints made possible by reflective judgment. Each 
demonstrates a particular strategy of vindicating the critical project, and yet each 
found it necessary to go beyond the boundaries Kant tried to maintain between 
determinative and reflective judgment. The first aims to ground the unity of reason on 
a fundamental principle, the second aims to build a system of laws. Kant sought to 
hold both kinds of system in tension, which is why the third Critique remains a 
singular and provocative text. 
 
A Göttingen school? 
A common feature that unites Kielmeyer, Reil, Girtanner and Oken is that 
each naturalist, at some stage of his career, came into contact with Johann 
Blumenbach’s lectures on physiology and natural history in the medical department at 
Göttingen. Noting this commonality, Lenoir identifies a ‘Göttingen school’ of 
physiology united by a shared commitment the scientific conception of natural history 
shared by Kant and Blumenbach. This conception of natural history, according to 
Lenoir, was based on a ‘teleomechanist research programme’ that enabled the 
development of transcendental morphology at the turn of the nineteenth century.8 
Lenoir’s claim is not that Kant’s successors followed the methodological approach to 
organic systems outlined in Critique of the Power of Judgment as some kind of 
programmatic textbook but rather that Kant ‘set forth a clear synthesis of the principal 
elements of an emerging consensus among biologists.’ 
While Lenoir’s proposal has significantly increased our understanding of this 
period of history by bringing the neglected work of the so-called Göttingen school to 
the attention of historians of science, in what follows I provide an alternative account. 
The Göttingen connection, I suggest, is in some senses arbitrary; Kielmeyer spent 
only a year under Blumenbach’s tuition, and Oken arrived after receiving his 
education in Würzburg, and was critical of Blumenbach from the start of his tenure.9 
More significantly, there is little textual evidence to support Lenoir’s reading of 
Blumenbach as the figurehead of a teleomechanist programme of research based on 
Kant’s natural history.10 Alternatively, I suggest that while this group of naturalists 
were clearly influenced by Blumenbach’s natural history, they were critical of his 
failure to resolve the tension between the mechanistic interpretation of Newtonianism 
and the vitalist account of the Lebenskraft offered by the Naturphilosophen. To find a 
solution they drew from the transcendental structure of Kant’s natural history, which 
does not ground experimental inquiry on facts about nature but rather on the structure 
of cognition. On my account, the joining thread of the physiologists and medical 
practitioners interested in Kant’s third Critique was a methodological form of vitalism 
that maintained a creative tension between the discursive nature of cognition and the 
ideal of a completed system. 
Before turning to this interpretation of Kant, it is important to begin with a 
brief sketch of Blumenbach’s conception of natural history. Blumenbach studied 
medicine at both Jena and Göttingen during the 1770s, where he came to know 
several of the founding figures of the Romantic Movement along with some of the 
most innovative medical practitioners of his day.11 His dissertation ‘On the Natural 
Varieties of Human Beings’ (1775) was widely read, and gained him the status of 
Privatdozent at Göttingen. His work grew rapidly in influence, and within three years 
he had advanced to ordinary professor.12 Textual evidence suggests that Blumenbach 
began to consider Kant’s philosophy in 1786 as a result of the dispute stemming from 
Kant’s reviews of Herder’s ‘Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind’ and 
Kant’s exchange with Georg Forster.13 The dispute concerned the epistemic status the 
formative force by which we can examine the development of organic form across 
time. While Herder presented the formative force as the hypothetical ground of 
natural phenomena though an analogy with Newton’s account of gravity, Kant sought 
to qualify the formative force as a regulative principle that governs our search for 
affinity in nature (see RHI 8:62). 
In Über den Bildungstrieb, Blumenbach presents this formative force as a 
drive responsible for organic effects. Like Herder he conceives of the Bildubgstrieb 
through an analogy with Newton’s gravitational force. Yet in contrast to Herder, he 
does not present the drive as a fundamental force that unites the totality of natural 
products in a universal natural history. Blumenbach seems to have agreed with Kant 
that such an account would merely assume what was meant to be discovered. Rather, 
he presents the Bildungstrieb as a programmatic hypothesis that enables the naturalist 
to examine the regularity of organic functions through experiment and observation: 
 
Hopefully it is unnecessary to remind most readers that the word 
Bildungstrieb, like the words attraction, gravity etc., should serve no more and 
no less than to signify a force [Kraft] whose constant effect is recognised from 
experience, and whose cause, like the causes of the aforementioned widely 
recognised natural powers, is for us an qualitas occulta.14 
 
Blumenbach presents his account of the Bildungstrieb as a postulated force that shares 
the hypothetical status of Newton’s gravity. Here Blumenbach builds not on Herder’s 
universal natural history but on Albrecht von Haller’s physiological method, which, in 
Blumenbach’s words, ‘begins as usual with the thing with which one denies the status 
of truth; and there, one harvests at long last that which possessed a mere honorific 
status, and one can now say, “that is what we have long been acquainted with!”’15 To 
examine the properties of organised beings, Haller proposed that the naturalist follows 
Newton’s procedure by positing an unknown faculty as X, and then seeks to discover 
its value without speculating in regards to its cause.16 Just as the hypothetical 
postulation of a force enabled Newton to discover the laws governing celestial 
dynamics, the Bildungstrieb enables the naturalist ‘to give closer determination to 
[organic] effects and bring them under general laws.’17 
Noting Blumenbach’s programmatic account of natural history in Über den 
Bildungstrieb, Lenoir claims that ‘Blumenbach’s ideas on natural history underwent a 
thorough revision in light of Kant’s analysis of the conceptual foundations for the 
construction of a scientific theory of organic form.’18 Two pieces of evidence suggest 
that Blumenbach was at least aware of Kant’s work. First, in August 1790, shortly 
following the publication of the third Critique, Kant (C 11:185) sent a letter to 
Blumenbach in which he praised his ‘excellent essay “On the Formative Impulse” 
[Über den Bildungstrieb]’, for he found much instruction on the matter of ‘the union 
of two principles that people have believed to be irreconcilable, namely the physical-
mechanistic and the merely teleological way of explaining organized nature.’ Second, 
in the 1807 version of his Handbuch der Naturgeschichte, Blumenbach praises 
Christoph Girtanner’s book Über das Kantische Prinzip für die Naturgeschichte 
(1796), which fuses Kant’s account of classification with Blumenbach’s 
Bildungstrieb. Yet as several scholars have contested, this evidence is insufficient to 
substantiate Lenoir’s claim that Blumenbach revised his work in light of Kant.19 For 
Robert Richards, the praise passed between Blumenbach and Kant does not indicate a 
shared research project but rather a misunderstanding of each other’s work, for 
Blumenbach grants the Bildungstrieb epistemic parity with Newton’s gravity, a 
comparison that Kant flatly denies.20 In the following sections I suggest only 
Girtanner remained impervious to the differences between Blumenbach and Kant. For 
Kielmeyer and Reil, Kant’s account of natural history placed reason’s systematicity 
within an experimental framework, opening an alternative conception of science to 
that presented in Naturphilosophie. 
  
Kielmeyer’s physics of the animal kingdom 
In a lecture given at the Hohen Karlsschule in 1793, Über die Verhältniße der 
organischen Kräfte, Kielmeyer outlines a new method for natural history that seeks to 
classify the organic world as a ‘series of organisations [Reihe der Organisationen].’21 
Kielmeyer takes up the methodological idea assumed by Blumenbach and Kant that 
the scala naturae provides a hypothesis that enables the naturalist to go looking for 
the forces that enable the logical connections that hold in one’s model. For Kielmeyer, 
such forces regulate the distribution of vital functions throughout the animal kingdom. 
These laws mark out a ‘Physik der Tierreichs’ discovered through comparative 
anatomical studies among animals. The goal of natural history is to systematise and 
unify the patterns by which form has unfolded to find common relations that give rise 
to general laws. 
 Kielmeyer presents his programme of research as a new method of 
classification grounded on experimental methodology. In Blumenbach’s account of 
the Bildungstrieb, the naturalist is able to discover the laws governing organic form 
by following Newton’s method of positing an X as the unknown force responsible for 
organic effects. Yet Blumenbach failed to distinguish this procedure from the 
discovery of the universal laws of nature, which means that the limits of mechanistic 
and teleological inquiry remained unestablished. Kant, on the other hand, denied that 
the Newtonian form of causation could capture the dynamics of organised beings. He 
argued that experimental Newtonianism does not discover particular causal laws by 
observing connections in nature but rather by representing connections in the form of 
categorised experience such that one can search for the grounds responsible for the 
effect. Connections in nature for Kant are necessarily represented in the form of 
causation, which provides the universal form X is the cause of Y. In Metaphysical 
Foundations Kant argued that natural history does not qualify as an experimental 
science precisely because it operates according to an alternative form of causation in 
which things of such and such a kind do Y when X happens (MF 4:468); for example, 
the thickness of a bird’s feathers increase as climactic temperature decreases (DR 
2:434). In the third Critique, Kant explains that the form of occasional forces is 
foreign to categorised experience, and claims that it is rather derived via an analogy 
with the form of practical reason (CPJ 5:351). 
In light of Kant’s qualification, Blumenbach might seem like a more obvious 
source if one were to propose a physics of the animal kingdom. Yet Kielmeyer 
nevertheless opens the address with a revised version of Kant’s account of space and 
time as forms of intuition.22 This account required modifications, however; for 
Kielmeyer, the capacity to identify some objects as living beings is not a matter of 
reflection that arises once determinant judgment has failed to provide sufficient 
determination. Rather, the examination of organic structure is a matter of the 
schematising understanding: 
 
If we, by the power of our minds, separate the phenomena of nature – for us 
connected in a system by space and time – for their connection, then surely 
those appearances that we isolate and subsume under the name ‘animate 
nature’, I mean the organisations of our earth, are the most able to fill us with 
feelings of nature’s greatness of those with which we are closely acquainted. 
To be sure, no masses, volumes, or distances found here are like those of the 
skies, by which nature convinces us of its greatness. However, if, when 
judging the greatness of an object, we can deign to give voice and listen with a 
little patience to the multiplicity [Vielheit], manifoldness [Mannigfaltigheit] 
and harmony [Harmonie] of effects in a small space and short periods of time, 
then there are things of another kind, that speak to us no less forcefully.23 
 
In this passage Kielmeyer extends the idea of an organised system to the entire 
biosphere. The idea is that the manifold of nature is presented to us in intuition within 
a spatio-temporal system, which is then schematised by the understanding. This 
system is not determined by particular laws; it is rather amenable to the determination 
of possible laws, for the understanding, in Kant’s view, is not concerned with ‘the 
totality of connections’ but with the sensibly given manifold, which it seeks to 
structure as classificatory and causal (B164). To provide further determination, we 
separate the phenomena to discern the particular grounds of their connection. While 
naturalists traditionally turn to the ordered movement of celestial spheres as the 
greatest example of the capacity of reason to order the cognitions of the 
understanding, Kielmeyer invites his listeners to turn instead to the independently 
structured multiplicity of the organic sphere, and to discern the harmony of effects 
and causes that speak to us of another kind of order. First, this leads us to note the 
incredible diversity of forms on the surface of the earth, which is an extremely small 
space compared to the planetary system. Second, this leads us to note the how these 
things occupy time: the changes that an organism undergoes results in the reciprocal 
adaptation of all the other organs, thus forming a system that is so united that ‘each is 
reciprocally cause and effect of the other.’24 This same configuration characterises the 
organisms within a species, and the organisms within an environmental system, which 
come together to ‘form the life of the great machine of the organic world.’25 
Kielmeyer’s temporal portrayal of the part-whole relationship that governs 
organic structure clearly builds on Kant’s account of organic form. However, his 
consideration of the organic sphere as a counterpart to celestial dynamics places the 
study of animate nature on the same footing as mechanical nature. This move shifts 
the study of particular organised beings, which Kant reserved for the historical 
doctrine of nature, to the domain Kant described as experimental physics (MF 4:468). 
Animate nature for Kielmeyer is not firstly a matter of reflective judgment but of 
intuition; it occupies space as an unfathomable manifold, in the same way as non-
living nature, and yet it occupies time in a fundamentally different manner: as a 
reciprocal relation of cause and effect, where the effect can also be understood as 
grounds for the cause. The system of the organic world is not made present through 
the symbolic equivalent to the schematism, as Kant had argued in the third Critique, 
which transposes the form of rational agency into a symbol for the reflective 
application of judgment (CPJ 5:352). Rather, animate nature for Kielmeyer is 
schematised by the understanding. Yet the judicial structure of animate nature is not 
fixed, for the system changes itself in time as natural history. The universal principle 
that structures animate nature as a unity is the ‘law of compensation 
[Kompensationsgesetz]’, by which each part self-regulates in dynamic relation to all 
the other parts.26 Such a principle cannot simply be a matter of the understanding, 
which operates according to laws that are universal and necessary, but also of reason, 
for it concerns the capacity of organised beings to respond to environmental 
conditions according to an inner principle of change. Kielmeyer’s goal is thus to 
systematise and unify the patterns by which form has unfolded to find common 
relations that give rise to general laws, thereby providing a scientific foundation for 
the system of nature. While the constitutive causes of organic nature cannot be 
grasped, nature must be examined as if it exhibited a technique analogous to 
purposeful action: 
 
we still must confess that the chain of effects and causes in most cases seems 
like a chain of means and ends to us and that we would find it advantageous 
for our reason to assume such a chain.27  
 
As Richards notes, Kielmeyer frames his claim in such a way that nature might not 
have intrinsic purposes, and that the search for higher goals might ultimately appear 
to be illusory.28 The success of the research program would however provide evidence 
that such a system does track an order in nature. The lecture demonstrates 
Kielmeyer’s commitment to a thoroughly materialist scientific program, displaying a 
goal that Kant and Blumenbach at least claimed to hold in common, that of uniting a 
thoroughly Newtonian account of matter with teleology. The form of Kielmeyer’s 
solution, however, is decidedly Kantian. 
 To grasp what defines this program as an experimental science, we need to 
return to the first Critique’s Architectonic of Pure Reason. There Kant argues that 
‘systematic unity is that which first makes ordinary cognition into a science, i.e. 
makes a system out of a mere aggregate of it’: 
 
I understand by a system … the unity of the manifold cognitions under one 
idea. This is the rational concept of the form of a whole … [this whole] is 
articulated (articulatio) and not heaped together (coacervatio); it can, to be 
sure, grow internally (per intus susceptionem) but not externally (per 
appositionem), like an animal body, whose growth does not add a limb but 
rather makes each limb stronger and fitter for this end without any alteration 
of proportion. (CPR A832-3/B860-1) 
 
It is no accident that Kant calls on an organic metaphor to elucidate reason’s 
systematicity. The systematic structure of rational cognition is not the result of a 
mechanical process, it is not fixed, and neither is it an artefact produced by a designer. 
Rather, the growth of a rational system is internal and enhances the proper 
functioning of its parts. Natural science forms a part of this system to the extent that it 
tells us what nature is from the theoretical standpoint, that is, as ruled by the 
legislation of the understanding. What Kant calls the ‘metaphysics of nature’ reveals 
the principles of physics (i.e. special metaphysics), which govern the application of 
mathematics to appearances. 
Yet the project Kielmeyer pursues is not one of natural science as the study of 
the rules of the understanding, but rather the construction of a natural system of 
empirical laws. This is where the third Critique comes into play. If we follow 
Kielmeyer’s lead, the problem Kant sets out to investigate in his Critique of the 
Power of Judgment is how it is possible to move from the metaphysics of nature to 
empirical nature. While efficient causes are sufficient to explain events, the 
arrangement of matter is contingent on such laws, which are blind to rationality. Kant 
explains this in the Introduction as follows: 
 
The understanding is of course in possession a priori of universal laws of 
nature, without which nature could not be an object of experience at all; but 
still it requires in addition a certain order of nature in its particular rules, 
which can only be known to it empirically and which from its point of view 
are contingent. (CPJ 5:184) 
 
This problem, Kant informs us, concerns the division between the theoretical and the 
practical spheres. This is not the problem of harmonizing nature and freedom in a 
philosophical system, however, but harmonizing them for the sake of experimental 
research. On the one hand, the theoretical sphere concerns propositions that determine 
experience according to the laws of nature, providing a conception of nature as an 
aggregate of appearances in time and space. On the other hand, the practical sphere 
concerns propositions that give law, and thus concern only the possibility of a 
represented object (through voluntary action). Thus a practical physics is an absurdity, 
for our construction of physical models is the pure consequence of a theory. Yet Kant 
notes that there is a practical part to physics insofar as it rests on empirical principles. 
In the First Introduction Kant calls such an investigation ‘experimental physics’ (FI 
20:198), which proceeds not ‘mechanically’ but ‘technically’ in order to discover the 
‘hidden laws of nature’. An experimental physics is ‘practical’ to the extent that it 
assumes that nature is the product of reasoned activity, and yet, unlike practical 
reason, it does not constitute what it represents. Rather, it searches for order within 
the manifold of appearances. Kant describes the process as follows: 
 
Now it is clear that the reflecting power of judgment, given its nature, could 
not undertake to classify the whole of nature according to its empirical 
differences if it did not presuppose that nature itself specifies its transcendental 
laws in accordance with some sort of principle. Now this principle can be 
none other than that of the suitability of the capacity of the power of judgment 
itself for finding in the immeasurable multiplicity of things in accordance with 
possible empirical laws sufficient kinship among them to enable them to be 
brought under empirical concepts (classes) and these in turn under more 
general laws (higher genera) and thus for an empirical system of nature to be 
reached … The special principle of the power of judgment is thus: Nature 
specifies its general laws into empirical ones, in accordance with the form of a 
logical system, in behalf of the power of judgment. (FI 20:215-6) 
 
Kant’s idea here is that we project the principle of reflective judgment up the order of 
cognition: ‘Through this [principle] we present nature as if an understanding 
contained the basis of the unity of what is diverse in nature’s empirical laws’ (CPJ 
5:181). Thus, by virtue of our capacity to examine the manifold of appearances as 
produced by an intuitive understanding, a sphere opens up between the metaphysics 
of nature and practical reason that we can observe in search for lawful appearances. 
As Kant later explains in §77, we can only ‘represent the agreement of natural laws 
with our power of judgment’ if we ‘at the same time conceive of another 
understanding’ for which the reciprocal relation between ends and means is not 
contingent on mechanical laws but necessary (CPJ 5:407). This negative 
representation sets the regulative ideal of an ordered system of nature. Without 
presupposing the agreement of laws and judgment, Kant explains, ‘we would have no 
order of nature in accordance with empirical laws, hence no guideline for an 
experience of this in all its multiplicity and for research into it’ (CPJ 5:185). With this 
presupposition in place we are able to credit some of our empirical generalizations 
with a necessary status by virtue of their incorporation in a system that is constructed 
by following certain rules that are necessary. Kant states that we consider such 
statements ‘as rules, (i.e., as necessary), because otherwise they would not constitute 
an order of nature, even though it does not and never can cognize their necessity’ 
(CPJ 5:185). The idea is that as our discursive representation gains in systematicity 
we can claim that it tracks reality as given to an intuitive intellect. The absolute 
limitation is reflected in the necessity of employing concepts that cannot be taken to 
determine an object but rather serve as formal rules. 
Kielmeyer’s address conveys a direct reference to Kant’s argument, for it 
argues that forces must be regarded as teleological principles that distinguish 
organisms from non-living matter. We must assume a Bildungstrieb as the 
organizational principle of each organized body so that we can go about classifying 
natural kinds according to ‘affinity’, what Kant defines in the first Critique as unity in 
variety and variety under unity ‘insofar as they have all sprouted from the one stem 
[Stamm]’ (CPR A660/B688). As Kant argues at length in the third Critique, this drive 
is not posited by analogy with Newtonian force but as an occasional force that 
responds to varying environmental conditions according to a pathway determined by 
an inner principle of organisation. The governing questions of Kielmeyer’s research 
program are thus, which forces gather in most individuals? What are the reciprocal 
relationships between these forces in different kinds of organisation? According to 
which laws are these relationships modified in the series of different kinds of 
organisation? In addition to the two Hallerian forces, sensibility and irritability, 
Kielmeyer identifies three more, which pertain to the formative force: reproduction, 
secretion, and propulsion. Each force is grounded on empirical observations, allowing 
Kielmeyer to view animal organization as a result of great machine of the organic 
world.29 
 
Reil and the Lebenskraft 
What is distinctive about Kielmayer’s address is that it presents a general 
scientific field concerned with the laws that regulate the organisation of living nature 
as a whole through examining the reciprocal relations that govern animate nature. Reil 
advanced a similar field of inquiry in his account of the Lebenskraft in the first edition 
of his journal, Archiv für die Physiologie. In the opening section he states that ‘the 
appearance of living bodies have their ground above all in matter.’30 While this 
explicitly contradicts Kant, it does not signal a commitment to Blumenbach’s 
Newtonian analogy or to Herder’s Naturphilosophie. Rather, Reil adopts a Kantian 
position by limiting our knowledge of matter to appearance in ‘outer sense’, which 
receives determination by the forms of representation provided by ‘inner sense’. In 
the Analogies of Experience Kant had established outer sense as the mark of 
objectivity, for the change in the appearances is not attributed to something occurring 
in us but rather in the object (A242/B197). In Metaphysical Foundations, our capacity 
to represent a system in outer sense is the hallmark of a scientific field of research 
(MF 4:468). For Reil, reason cannot determine a priori the specific causal structure of 
living beings, for organic structure is not a matter of inner sense. Drawing explicitly 
from Kant’s notion of force in Metaphysical Foundations, he claims that ‘Structure 
and organization is … the appearance and effect of matter itself.’31 In Reil’s account, 
if appearances in outer sense are the effects of matter in motion, then the 
representation of organic beings cannot be a mere matter of inner sense but ‘must be 
grounded in the spatial, in matter.’32 The ‘doctrine of nature [Naturlehre]’, he states, 
‘is the science of the qualities of things in the world of sense.’33 Living and dead 
matter can be separated according to their qualities, just as vegetable and animal 
matter can again be separated. Matter alone for Reil simply cannot determine a priori 
the variety of natural bodies, for if that were so, ‘there would be no necessity for 
employing the concept of Kraft.’34 Consider the case of generation: how the seed 
(Keim) or stem (Stamm) originally arose, how it formed, and whether it contains the 
entire organic individual in miniature or only a part, this ‘we do not know’.35 Yet we 
can proceed by searching for affinity within the world of sense on the assumption that 
a seed is there to be found. Reil cites Kant’s account of the natural end, and agrees 
that we must consider organisms as individuals in which each part is related to the 
other reciprocally as means and ends.36 Yet his language suggests that he understood 
the organising force as a causal relation established by cognition. He argues that ‘each 
part forms itself and maintains itself through its own energy’, suggesting that the 
connection each part holds with the others is the result of this energy rather than a 
manifestation of it.37 For Reil, the Lebenskraft enables the naturalist to examine the 
part-whole dynamic of organised beings as a causal relation, thereby opening an 
experimental science concerned with the laws governing the organic sphere. 
Kant of course recognised the gap between the metaphysics of nature and 
empirical nature in Metaphysical Foundations and Critique of the Power of Judgment. 
Reil does not reject Kant’s view of experimental physics in favour of Herder’s 
empirical hypothesis or Blumenbach’s Newtonian analogy. Like Kant, he held that 
natural science requires transcendental grounding if its results are to be more than 
arbitrary, unverifiable propositions. Unless the naturalist has grounds to represent 
their experimental system in outer sense they lose the capacity to convince others that 
their system carves nature at its joints (see A820/B848). Yet Reil – like Kielmeyer – 
argues that Kant’s addition of a reflective modality of judgment did not go far enough 
to bridge the gap between understanding and reason. Kant’s account of reflective 
judgment supposedly traverses the gap between reason and nature by enabling 
judgment to reflect on the cognitions of the understanding though the principle of 
purposiveness. Yet what are the effects in the manifold by which we identify the 
reciprocal cause and effect temporality of animate beings? How could we possibly 
recognise them, if reflective judgment were based on an analogy with something in 
inner sense? The solution for Reil involves the expansion of Kant’s physics to bestow 
a quasi-objective status to occasional causation, granting to the Lebenskräfte the 
capacity to guide the naturalist toward the discovery of empirical causal laws. 
 Girtanner and the Kantian principle 
Christoph Girtanner was more willing to accept the limits Kant placed on the 
judgment of organisms as natural ends than Kielmeyer and Reil. In Über das 
Kantische Prinzip für die Naturgeschichte (1796) he presents Kant’s account of 
reflective judgment as the basis for a research programme that, for the first time, 
warrants the name natural history. Girtanner’s system of classification accepts Kant’s 
account of the germs and dispositions outlined in his essays on race, which determine 
the limits of structural adaptation in organised beings by manifesting various qualities 
in response to changes in environmental conditions. While Kant had proposed a 
methodological account of the Bildungstrieb to account for the structural 
modifications within a species to determine various lines of decent as races, Girtanner 
uses the Bildungstrieb to examine common lines of decent that lead to various 
species. Following Kant, he claims that the task of natural history is to show ‘how the 
original form of each and every original stem [Stammgattung] of animals and plants 
was constructed, and how species [Gattungen] have gradually been derived from their 
original stems.’38 Yet lacking the sophistication of Keilmeyer and Reil’s treatment of 
Kant’s epistemology, Girtanner proposes a system of classification based on laws in 
nature. He claims that because organised bodies are both ‘end and means’ for 
themselves, that is, because they are self-causing, natural history provides an account 
of natural laws that are real and genetic (Naturgattungen): 
 
Natural history, in the philosophical sense, divides organized bodies into 
stems according to their affinities in respect to generation. It is based on the 
communal law of propagation [fortpflanzung]. The unity of the species is 
according to the unity of their generative forces. In this way a system of nature 
is formed for the understanding, a classification of organized bodies under 
rules, and in particular, under the laws of the formative drive 
[Bildungstrieb].39 
 
Girtanner’s aim not simply to apply Kant’s principle of classification to natural 
history but also to establish the compatibility of Kant and Blumenbach’s views on 
generation, for both explain how environmental changes on earth occasioned dramatic 
changes in life forms. While he clearly overlooks the difference between 
Blumenbach’s Newtonian presentation of the Bildungstrieb and Kant’s reflective 
account of organic structure, he nevertheless extends Kant’s claim in the third 
Critique that under such a principle the ‘agreement of nature without our faculty of 
cognition is presupposed a priori by the power of judgment in behalf of its reflection 
on nature in accordance with empirical laws’ (CPJ 5:187). To frame his research 
program in opposition to the speculative program advanced by the Naturphilosophen, 
wherein new species emerge through non-lawful breaks in a line of decent, Girtanner 
endorses Kant’s demonstration that however dramatic natural changes might be, the 
variation within species always emerges under the guidance of laws. 
 
The third standpoint: from the top or the bottom of the ladder? 
The interpretation of the third Critique found in Kielmeyer, Reil and Girtanner 
provides an alternative representation of Kant’s project to that found in the familiar 
Kant to Hegel picture. The absolute systematicity reading emphasizes Kant’s 
awareness of the impassable gap between nature and freedom. It thus suggests that the 
third Critique sets out to reconcile the critical dualism by identifying our access to the 
supersensible substrate through our faculty for feeling pleasure and displeasure. 
Reflective judgment allows us to climb the ladder from the many to the one to 
represent nature as an organic whole, a self-organising system. The experimental 
systematicity reading, on the other hand, emphasizes Kant’s awareness of the gap 
between the metaphysics of nature and empirical nature. This is still a practical 
problem, but one concerning the need for a quasi-practical (i.e. technical) 
experimental physics. On this view, reflective judgment enables the naturalist to 
presume a point at which empirical laws ultimately converge in the form of a system, 
the possibility of which is vindicated by the establishment of it. For Kielmeyer and 
Reil, this involves a modified version of Kant’s transcendental physics; the 
Lebenkräfte are granted a quasi-objective status by virtue of their role within the 
system that we build from the ground up toward the practical guidelines set by reason. 
Both interpretations find in Kant’s account of reflective judgment a ladder that 
allows us to climb from the metaphysics of nature to nature as a system of laws even 
though such a system is not (yet) available to us. The first stresses the speculative 
view from the top: by judging nature as a self-organizing system, thereby completing 
the absolute system, we can then investigate empirical laws.40 The second stresses the 
experimental view from the ground: we search for empirical laws along the guiding 
lines set forth by reflective judgment in order to vindicate our reflective estimation of 
nature’s purposiveness. In this sense both interpretations find in Kant’s third Critique 
a manifesto for an experimental science, which, as Schelling explains in the First 
Outline, had hitherto been viewed as ‘a mongrel idea that implies no consistent 
thought, or rather, is an idea which cannot be thought at all.’41 The first pursues this 
along the lines of Naturphilosophie, the second of a methodological form of vitalism. 
 In this final section I want to examine the singularity of Kant’s project; why it 
stands apart from other philosophies of nature and how the tensions it captures 
generate the extensive philosophical energy evinced by interpretations that can be 
traced back to it. As Philippe Huneman notes, if we were concerned with comparing 
the philosophical theses of those thinkers at the turn of the nineteenth century 
interested in transforming natural history into a scientific endeavour, ‘one would have 
to stress Kant’s isolation.’42 As is well-recognised in the literature, any attempt to 
identify Kant as the father of either German Idealism or biology as a unified science 
must distort Kant’s views on the level of theory.43 Yet if our history of this period 
aims rather to compare conceptual lineages opened by creative moments of 
philosophical synthesis, then we discover in the third Critique an extremely rich 
collection of problems that remain strikingly relevant to contemporary philosophy.44 
The work of Lorenz Oken represents a confluence of both interpretations of 
the third Critique. Oken worked as a Privatdozent at Göttingen several years after 
Kielmeyer, Reil and Girtanner had attended as students (1805-7). In contrast to 
Kielmeyer, Reil and Girtanner, Oken was educated at Würzburg and was strongly 
influenced by Schelling’s circle and their early work on Naturphilosophie. He 
rejected Blumenbach as the figurehead of a new science of organisms, writing to 
Schelling in May 1805 that Blumenbach ‘lectures on the classification of animals as if 
it were a mathematical truth that they must be divided just as he has divided them – 
not a word to justify this classification, or about others.’45 The issue at stake, Oken 
insists, is how systematicity is justified. In his view, the fundamental task of natural 
history is to build to a system of comparative physiology on empirical sources that 
provide a view in miniature of developmental change.46 His method is not ‘to start 
directly at the origin of the organic world, but rather to go back to the first stirring of 
the universe, and to let the whole of nature emerge gradually from there.’47 Of course, 
Oken was aware that we cannot build an objective history of nature’s development. 
Kant was charged for presenting a ‘science of the gods’ by Forster in 1786, which 
initially motivated his reflective account of judgment in his teleology essay of 1788.48 
During the late 1780s Kant became increasingly aware of the problematic gap 
between empirical nature and a genuine metaphysics of nature, and sought to provide 
a way that the natural researcher might transition from one to the other. Yet for Oken, 
natural history can extend further than the discovery of affinities between fossilized 
remains and the present diversity of organic life. The task of natural history, as he saw 
it, is ‘to find the universal order within the particular givenness of natural 
processes.’49 Kant had claimed that the experimental investigation of empirical 
objects strives towards a universal understanding of nature; every empirical 
investigation presupposes that nature ‘adheres to a parsimony suitable for our 
judgment and a uniformity we can grasp’ (CPJ 5:213). Oken provides a liberal 
interpretation of Kant’s experimental presentation of systematicty to the extent that he 
connects description, classification, anatomy, physiology and chemistry into one all-
encompassing theoretical framework called ‘biology’. However, if the basic goal of 
systematicity is to establish the individual laws of nature as necessarily true, and if the 
only way this can be achieved is by the integration of these laws into a system, it 
would seem that systematicity is a condition of the possibility of experience itself. 
That is, it would seem that systematicity is on par with the constitutive principles of 
the understanding. For Oken, the task of the Naturphilosoph is to remove the 
assimilation of thinking and finite thinking – to adopt the standpoint afforded by 
Kant’s reflective judgment – so that life and thought become one. Goethe presents a 
similar thought in ‘Pure Concepts’ (1792): 
 
Because the simpler powers of nature are often hidden from our senses, we 
must seek to reach out to them though the powers of our mind and to represent 
their nature in ourselves, for we can not behold them outside ourselves. … 
[for] our mind stands in harmony with the deeper lying simpler powers of 
nature and thus can represent them purely, as we perceive the objects of the 
visible world with a clear eye.50  
 
Goethe identifies a deeper confluence between inner and outer sense than Reil had 
sketched in his reading of Kant. For Kant, while reason looks for the unconditioned 
the understanding is limited to the series of conditioned effects. This is precisely why 
reflective judgment can investigate the space between the conditioned and the 
unconditioned. Yet for Goethe, the organism is a special case, for it leads us toward 
the speculative thought of the organism’s existence as a free natural purpose, even 
though such an existence must remain inexplicable for the understanding. Goethe saw 
that Kant’s teleological approach to nature provided a way to speak of final causes in 
nature without invoking a divine artisan in nature’s etiology. His notion of 
metamorphosis defines the process by which the archetype moves through nature with 
various functions and with frequent changes in form, none of which are preordained 
but all of which form part of nature as a whole. When ‘an organism manifests itself’, 
he claims, we are able to ‘grasp the unity and freedom of its formative impulse.’51 
 The program of Naturphilosophie developed by Oken, Schelling and Goethe 
departs from Kant to the extent that it accepts that freedom and nature can be unified 
without eliminating freedom. The experimental physics of Kielmeyer and Reil 
oversteps the reflective limits Kant placed on our knowledge of the Lebenkräfte. What 
both interpretations establish is that Kant’s recognition of a third standpoint, one that 
warrants its own critique, opens an investigative field between the metaphysics of 
nature and nature understood as an empirical manifold that is neither preestablished 
nor the product of a divine artisan, but rather an underdetermined field of phenomena 
that is subject to experimental investigation and systematic reconstruction. Kant 
continually denied this field equal status with experimental physics on the grounds 
that we cannot examine historical structural modifications in experience. Yet this 
restriction stemmed from Kant’s unswerving commitment to avoid explanations that 
lie ‘outside the field of the observational doctrine of nature’ and belong instead to 
‘speculative nature’ (RHI 8:54). The strategy shared by the absolute and experimental 
systematists not so much to overcome Kant’s limitations as it is to show that we do 
have evidence within the observational field by which to determine the laws 
governing the organic sphere. Kant’s attempt to hold two seemingly irreconcilable 
commitments – to nature as an exhaustively determined sphere subject to rigorous 
scientific analysis and to freedom as the capacity for self-legislation – opened this 
third standpoint from which we reflect on nature as a whole. His insight is made 
possible by his recognition that the question of the unity of nature and freedom, and 
the question of the lawfulness of organic structure, bears on us as humans, not merely 
as knowers or agents. Kant’s third Critique remains a singular and provocative text to 
the extent that what it means for us as organic creatures to look out upon nature, to 
feel its potency, beauty and its self-expressive order, remains a philosophically 
energizing standpoint today. 
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